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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs-

Case No. 9189

CARL MACK COURTNEY,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Respondent is, in essential agreement with appellant's
statement. However, the following facts should be mentioned. As to the matter of the "clicking" of the gun (T.
64 toT. 67) the expert said he didn't know about a clicking sound. (T. 64). At T. 65 the Court mentions a slight
clicking sound. A demonstration of slight clicking occurs
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at T. 66. While Irwin was not completely clear as to
whether the gun was pointed at_ his stomach at the time
of the shot, he did emphasize that the appellant's head and
arm were pointed at him.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANT AND ITS JUDGMENT WAS
PROPERLY RENDERED.

POINT II.
AN INSTRUCTION AS TO INCLUDED OFFENSES NEED NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF A
REQUEST BY DEFENDANT.
POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS BASED ON PROPER
EVIDgNCE.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER THE
DEFENDANT AND ITS JUDGMENT WAS
PROPERLY RENDERED.
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Appellant has set out the text of Sections 77-21-6 and
77-21-8, U.C.A. 1953, and relies greatly on them. As far
as the two sections are pertinent, they read as follows:
77-21-6. "The information may be in substantially
the following form * * * "
77-21-8. "(2) The information or indictment may
refer to a section or subsection of any statute creating the offense charged therein * * *."
Clearly the two statutes, by use of the term "may"
are made directory and pennissive rather than mandatory. Otherwise the term "shall" would have been used
Subsection (1) of Section 77-21-8 states:
"(1) The information or indictment may charge·,
and is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense
for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one
or more of the following ways:
(a) By using the name given to the offense by the
common law by a statute.
(b) By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in terms of the common law or of the
statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the
court and the defendant notice of what offense is
intended to be charged."
Respondent believes that the information used in this
case fully complies with both paragraphs (a) and (b). The
information uses the words " * * * assaulted Gorman W.
Irwin with a deadly weapon * * *."
This wording is extremely close to the language in the
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heading of Section 76-7-6 which defines the offense. The
information also, in words of substantially the same meaning, gives enough of the definition of the crime to provide
notice of the offense intended to be charged.
In the case of People v. Hill, 3 Utah 334, 3 Pac. 75, the
Court stated:

" * * *It would appear to be sufficient if the charge
be stated with so much certainty that defendant
may know what he is called upon to answer, and
the court how to render judgment. In other words,
substantial justice should be more sought after
than artificial nicety."
It would be absurd to assume that appellant was, or possibly could have been, being properly represented by experienced counsel, in doubt as to the fact that the acts alleged, if true, constituted a crime against the State of
Utah, and not, as suggested in appellant's brief, page 12,
a crime against religion, nature, morals, or ethics.
Furthermore, if appellant was mystified over the
nature of the charge he was at perfect liberty to request
a bill of particulars as provided by the terms of Section
77-21-9, U.C.A. 1953, a right the defendant must be given
on demand and· one not discretionary with the Court. State
v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 P.2d 104.
Moreover, appellant could have made, but did not
make, a motion to quash the information. This could have
been done up to the time of his entering his plea thereto.
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It is clear, therefore, that (1) the crime was properly
charged; (2) appellant was properly apprised of the crime
charged; (3) appellant could have requested and received
a bill of particulars but failed to do so; (4) appellant could
have moved to quash the information, but failed to do so
and thus waived his objections to it.

Since the information was in all respects proper, and
since appellant did not call any supposed error to the attention of the Court, the allegations of his first point must
now be disregarded.
POINT II.
AN INSTRUCTION AS TO INCLUDED OFFENSES NEED NOT HAVE BEEN GIVEN AS A
MATTER OF LAW IN THE ABSENCE OF A
REQUEST BY DEFENDANT.

Appellant is not entitled to a reversal of his conviction
on the ground that no instruction was given as to lesser
offenses included within the crime of assault with a deadly
weapon.
The early Utah case, State v. McCurtain, 52 Utah 63,
172 Pac. 481, laid down the general rule that " * * * If
counsel desire to have the court charge upon a particular
phase of the case, or upon a collateral issue * * *, they
must offer a proper request and if it is refused save an exception. Without this the question may not be reviewed."
The Utah case of State v. Sullivan, 73 Utah 582, 276
Pac. 166, mentioned by appellant, contains the following
language:
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"Moreover, the great weight of authority is that,
before a defendant can be heard to complain because the trial court did not instruct upon the law
of lesser offenses included within the crime
charged, such defendant must have requested instruction upon the included offense or offenses."
The Court then sets out the citations of 27 cases supporting this view, including those from Idaho, Colorado and
California courts.
The Court then continues:
"Similar views have been expressed by this Court.
People v. Robinson, 6 Utah 101, 21 Pac. 403; State
v. McCurtain, 52, Utah 63, 172 Pac. 481. In the case
of People v. Robinson, a distinction is made between a case where there are different degrees of
the offense charged and a case where there may
be a lesser offense included within the crime
charged."
The Sullivan case still appears to be the law in Utah despite the existence of Section 77-31-5, U.C.A. 1953, cited
at appellant's brief, page 19.
Appellant relies strongly on State v. Barkas, 91 Utah
574, 65 P.2d 1130. There, however, the instruction was
requested by defendant but denied by the Court. There
is a vast difference between the right to have a certain instrution given when you ask for it, and to have it given
even though you don't ask for it, as in this case.
The courts cannot properly be deemed in reversible
error by the failure of criminal defendants, either pur-
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posely or inadvertently, to ask for instructions as to included offenses.
Appellant waived his right to such an instruction by
his failure to make the request, and his second point is
without merit.

POINT III.
THE VERDICT WAS BASED ON PROPER EVIDENCE..
The jury had evidence before it sufficient to support
a verdict of guilty.
At page 21 of his brief, appellant says that the prosecuting witness provoked a fight with the defendant. This
is not true, since appellant recklessly drove his car in
such a fashion as to throw oily gravel all over the windshield of Irwin's car. (T'. 4, T. 37).
While the prosecuting witness admits, using crude
language on appellant in his anger over having his car
splattered, even so he had neither the present intention nor
the ability to start a fight as long as appellant remained
in his car. Nor are words alone sufficient provocation.
As to his intention, Irwin testified (T. 4):

" * * * If he

did that again I would punch him in

the nose."
By clear infeTence the intention expressed by this state-
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ment insured that if appellant did not do the act again
he would not be punched in the nose.
Appellant, therefore, had the full power to avoid any
serious altercation of any kind. But this he did not choose
to do. In his anger he continued for a short distance up
the road, then pulled his car to the side of the highway,
(T. 6, T. 38), stopped and parked it and got out of his car
with a pistol in one hand and a beer bottle in the other,
(T. 38). One can scarcely imagine an act more clearly indicative of an intention to commit bodily harm. Followed
by the shooting, this clearly constituted the commission
of an assault with a deadly weapon.
In view of the rather modest provocation provided
by Irwin in response to the gravel incident and the present
and complete ability of appellant to avoid any further
difficulty whatsoever, it is obvious that appellant's acts
were done without just cause or excuse and with no considerable provocation, thus bringing him fully within the
requirements of the statute establishing the crime of assault with a deadly weapon.
The evidence clearly showed that appellant pointed
his pistol in the direction of the prosecuting witness,
pulled the trigger four times, even though, because of
mechanical failure, successfully firing it only once. (T. 9,
T. 18). Fortunately, Irwin was not hit, but this was due
only to the poor marksmanship of appellant and not any
kindly intentions in his heart. This is further suggested
by the fact that when the gun failed to respond, appellant
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began swinging violently at Irwin with his beer bottle.
(T. 7, T. 8).

The Court is reluctant to substitute its judgment for
that of the trial jury. The jury here was properly instructed in every particular and evidently it concluded that
appellant had initiated the fight, that he did not act in
self defense, and that he committed the assault without
just cause or excuse.
Every necessary element of the crime of assault with
a deadly weapon is present in the facts proved and therefore appellant's point three cannot be sustained.
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above the appeal of Carl Mack
Courtney should be dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
WALTER L. BUDGE
Attorney General
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Assistant Attorney General

Attorneys for Respondent
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